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Временно бесплатные курсы Udemy

Временно бесплатные курсы Udemy

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Подборка временно бесплатных курсов Udemy.122 шт. Промокоды, вшиты в ссылки.Все курсы на английском.

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Vault 7 - CIA Hacking Tools Revealed

Vault 7 - CIA Hacking Tools Revealed
March 07, 2017
from Wikileaks Website


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Press Release
Today, Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of leaks on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
Code-named "Vault 7" by WikiLeaks, it is the largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency.
The first full part of the series, "Year Zero", comprises 8,761 documents and files from an isolated, high-security network situated inside the CIA's Center for Cyber Intelligence (below image) in Langley, Virgina.
It follows an introductory disclosure last month of CIA targeting French political parties and candidates in the lead up to the 2012 presidential election.
Recently, the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including,
  1. malware
  2. viruses
  3. trojans
  4. weaponized "zero day" exploits
  5. malware remote control systems

...and associated documentation.
This extraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor the entire hacking capacity of the CIA.
The archive appears to have been circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive.
"Year Zero" introduces the scope and direction of the CIA's global covert hacking program, its malware arsenal and dozens of "zero day" weaponized exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European company products, include,

  1. Apple's iPhone
  2. Google's Android
  3. Microsoft's Windows
  4. Samsung TVs,

...which are turned into covert microphones.
Since 2001 the CIA has gained political and budgetary preeminence over the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).
The CIA found itself building not just its now infamous drone fleet, but a very different type of covert, globe-spanning force - its own substantial fleet of hackers.
The agency's hacking division freed it from having to disclose its often controversial operations to the NSA (its primary bureaucratic rival) in order to draw on the NSA's hacking capacities.
By the end of 2016, the CIA's hacking division, which formally falls under the agency's Center for Cyber Intelligence (CCI - below image), had over 5000 registered users and had produced more than a thousand,
hacking systems trojans viruses,
...and other "weaponized" malware.


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Such is the scale of the CIA's undertaking that by 2016, its hackers had utilized more codes than those used to run Facebook.
The CIA had created, in effect, its "own NSA" with even less accountability and without publicly answering the question as to whether such a massive budgetary spend on duplicating the capacities of a rival agency could be justified.
In a statement to WikiLeaks the source details policy questions that they say urgently need to be debated in public, including whether the CIA's hacking capabilities exceed its mandated powers and the problem of public oversight of the agency.
The source wishes to initiate a public debate about the security, creation, use, proliferation and democratic control of cyberweapons.
Once a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by rival states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike.

Julian Assange, WikiLeaks editor stated that,
"There is an extreme proliferation risk in the development of cyber 'weapons'.
Comparisons can be drawn between the uncontrolled proliferation of such 'weapons', which results from the inability to contain them combined with their high market value, and the global arms trade.
But the significance of 'Year Zero' goes well beyond the choice between cyberwar and cyberpeace. The disclosure is also exceptional from a political, legal and forensic perspective."

Wikileaks has carefully reviewed the "Year Zero" disclosure and published substantive CIA documentation while avoiding the distribution of 'armed' cyberweapons until a consensus emerges on the technical and political nature of the CIA's program and how such 'weapons' should analyzed, disarmed and published.

Wikileaks has also decided to Redact (see far below) and Anonymize some identifying information in "Year Zero" for in depth analysis. These redactions include ten of thousands of CIA targets and attack machines throughout,
Latin America Europe the United States

While we are aware of the imperfect results of any approach chosen, we remain committed to our publishing model and note that the quantity of published pages in "Vault 7" part one ("Year Zero") already eclipses the total number of pages published over the first three years of the Edward Snowden NSA leaks.

Analysis

CIA malware targets iPhone, Android, smart TVs
CIA malware and hacking tools are built by EDG (Engineering Development Group), a software development group within CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence), a department belonging to the CIA's DDI (Directorate for Digital Innovation).
The DDI is one of the five major directorates of the CIA (see above image of the CIA for more details).
The EDG is responsible for the development, testing and operational support of all backdoors, exploits, malicious payloads, trojans, viruses and any other kind of malware used by the CIA in its covert operations world-wide.
The increasing sophistication of surveillance techniques has drawn comparisons with George Orwell's 1984, but "Weeping Angel", developed by the CIA's Embedded Devices Branch (EDB), which infests smart TVs, transforming them into covert microphones, is surely its most emblematic realization.
The attack against Samsung smart TVs was developed in cooperation with the United Kingdom's MI5/BTSS.
After infestation, Weeping Angel places the target TV in a 'Fake-Off' mode, so that the owner falsely believes the TV is off when it is on. In 'Fake-Off' mode the TV operates as a bug, recording conversations in the room and sending them over the Internet to a covert CIA server.
As of October 2014 the CIA was also looking at infecting the vehicle control systems used by modern cars and trucks. The purpose of such control is not specified, but it would permit the CIA to engage in nearly undetectable assassinations.
The CIA's Mobile Devices Branch (MDB) developed numerous attacks to remotely hack and control popular smart phones. Infected phones can be instructed to send the CIA the user's geolocation, audio and text communications as well as covertly activate the phone's camera and microphone.
Despite iPhone's minority share (14.5%) of the global smart phone market in 2016, a specialized unit in the CIA's Mobile Development Branch produces malware to infest, control and exfiltrate data from iPhones and other Apple products running iOS, such as iPads.
CIA's arsenal includes numerous local and remote "zero days" developed by CIA or obtained from GCHQ, NSA, FBI or purchased from cyber arms contractors such as Baitshop.
The disproportionate focus on iOS may be explained by the popularity of the iPhone among social, political, diplomatic and business elites.
A similar unit targets Google's Android which is used to run the majority of the world's smart phones (~85%) including Samsung, HTC and Sony. 1.15 billion Android powered phones were sold last year.
"Year Zero" shows that as of 2016 the CIA had 24 "weaponized" Android "zero days" which it has developed itself and obtained from GCHQ, NSA and cyber arms contractors.
These techniques permit the CIA to bypass the encryption of, WhatsApp
  1. Signal
  2. Telegram
  3. Wiebo
  4. Confide
  5. Cloackman
...by hacking the "smart" phones that they run on and collecting audio and message traffic before encryption is applied.
CIA malware targets Windows, OSx, Linux, routers
The CIA also runs a very substantial effort to infect and control Microsoft Windows users with its malware.
This includes multiple local and remote weaponized "zero days", air gap jumping viruses such as "Hammer Drill" which infects software distributed on CD/DVDs, infectors for removable media such as USBs, systems to hide data in images or in covert disk areas ("Brutal Kangaroo") and to keep its malware infestations going.
Many of these infection efforts are pulled together by the CIA's Automated Implant Branch (AIB), which has developed several attack systems for automated infestation and control of CIA malware, such as "Assassin" and "Medusa".
Attacks against Internet infrastructure and webservers are developed by the CIA's Network Devices Branch (NDB).
The CIA has developed automated multi-platform malware attack and control systems covering Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris, Linux and more, such as EDB's "HIVE" and the related "Cutthroat" and "Swindle" tools, which are described in the examples section far below.
CIA 'hoarded' vulnerabilities ("zero days")
In the wake of Edward Snowden's leaks about the NSA, the U.S. technology industry secured a commitment from the Obama administration that the executive would disclose on an ongoing basis - rather than hoard - serious vulnerabilities, exploits, bugs or "zero days" to Apple, Google, Microsoft, and other US-based manufacturers.
Serious vulnerabilities not disclosed to the manufacturers places huge swathes of the population and critical infrastructure at risk to foreign intelligence or cyber criminals who independently discover or hear rumors of the vulnerability.
If the CIA can discover such vulnerabilities so can others.
The U.S. government's commitment to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process came after significant lobbying by US technology companies, who risk losing their share of the global market over real and perceived hidden vulnerabilities.
The government stated that it would disclose all pervasive vulnerabilities discovered after 2010 on an ongoing basis.
"Year Zero" documents show that the CIA breached the Obama administration's commitments. Many of the vulnerabilities used in the CIA's cyber arsenal are pervasive and some may already have been found by rival intelligence agencies or cyber criminals.
As an example, specific CIA malware revealed in "Year Zero" is able to penetrate, infest and control both the Android phone and iPhone software that runs or has run presidential Twitter accounts.
The CIA attacks this software by using undisclosed security vulnerabilities ("zero days") possessed by the CIA but if the CIA can hack these phones then so can everyone else who has obtained or discovered the vulnerability.
As long as the CIA keeps these vulnerabilities concealed from Apple and Google (who make the phones) they will not be fixed, and the phones will remain hackable.
The same vulnerabilities exist for the population at large, including the U.S. Cabinet, Congress, top CEOs, system administrators, security officers and engineers.
By hiding these security flaws from manufacturers like Apple and Google the CIA ensures that it can hack everyone at the expense of leaving everyone hackable.
'Cyberwar' programs are a serious proliferation risk
Cyber 'weapons' are not possible to keep under effective control.
While nuclear proliferation has been restrained by the enormous costs and visible infrastructure involved in assembling enough fissile material to produce a critical nuclear mass, cyber 'weapons', once developed, are very hard to retain.
Cyber 'weapons' are in fact just computer programs which can be pirated like any other. Since they are entirely comprised of information they can be copied quickly with no marginal cost.
Securing such 'weapons' is particularly difficult since the same people who develop and use them have the skills to exfiltrate copies without leaving traces - sometimes by using the very same 'weapons' against the organizations that contain them.
There are substantial price incentives for government hackers and consultants to obtain copies since there is a global "vulnerability market" that will pay hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for copies of such 'weapons'.
Similarly, contractors and companies who obtain such 'weapons' sometimes use them for their own purposes, obtaining advantage over their competitors in selling 'hacking' services.
Over the last three years the United States intelligence sector, which consists of government agencies such as the CIA and NSA and their contractors, such as Booz Allan Hamilton, has been subject to unprecedented series of data exfiltrations by its own workers.
A number of intelligence community members not yet publicly named have been arrested or subject to federal criminal investigations in separate incidents.
Most visibly, on February 8, 2017 a U.S. federal grand jury indicted Harold T. Martin III with 20 counts of mishandling classified information.
The Department of Justice alleged that it seized some 50,000 gigabytes of information from Harold T. Martin III that he had obtained from classified programs at NSA and CIA, including the source code for numerous hacking tools.
Once a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by peer states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike.
U.S. Consulate in Frankfurt is a covert CIA hacker base
In addition to its operations in Langley, Virginia the CIA also uses the U.S. consulate in Frankfurt as a covert base for its hackers covering Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
CIA hackers operating out of the Frankfurt consulate ("Center for Cyber Intelligence Europe" or CCIE) are given diplomatic ("black") passports and State Department cover.
The instructions for incoming CIA hackers make Germany's counter-intelligence efforts appear inconsequential: "Breeze through German Customs because you have your cover-for-action story down pat, and all they did was stamp your passport" Your Cover Story (for this trip) Q: Why are you here? A: Supporting technical consultations at the Consulate. Two earlier WikiLeaks publications give further detail on CIA approaches to customs and secondary screening procedures.
Once in Frankfurt CIA hackers can travel without further border checks to the 25 European countries that are part of the Shengen open border area - including France, Italy and Switzerland.
A number of the CIA's electronic attack methods are designed for physical proximity.
These attack methods are able to penetrate high security networks that are disconnected from the internet, such as police record database. In these cases, a CIA officer, agent or allied intelligence officer acting under instructions, physically infiltrates the targeted workplace.
The attacker is provided with a USB containing malware developed for the CIA for this purpose, which is inserted into the targeted computer. The attacker then infects and exfiltrates data to removable media.
For example, the CIA attack system Fine Dining, provides 24 decoy applications for CIA spies to use.
To witnesses, the spy appears to be running a program showing videos (e.g VLC), presenting slides (Prezi), playing a computer game (Breakout2, 2048) or even running a fake virus scanner (Kaspersky, McAfee, Sophos).
But while the decoy application is on the screen, the underlying system is automatically infected and ransacked.
How the CIA dramatically increased proliferation risks
In what is surely one of the most astounding intelligence own goals in living memory, the CIA structured its classification regime such that for the most market valuable part of "Vault 7", the CIA's, weaponized malware (implants + zero days) Listening Posts (LP) Command and Control (C2) systems, ...the agency has little legal recourse.
The CIA made these systems unclassified.
Why the CIA chose to make its cyber-arsenal unclassified reveals how concepts developed for military use do not easily crossover to the 'battlefield' of cyber 'war'.
To attack its targets, the CIA usually requires that its implants communicate with their control programs over the internet.
If CIA implants, Command & Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers could be prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the Internet.
Consequently the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber spying/war code unclassified. The U.S. government is not able to assert copyright either, due to restrictions in the U.S. Constitution.
This means that cyber 'arms' manufactures and computer hackers can freely "pirate" these 'weapons' if they are obtained. The CIA has primarily had to rely on obfuscation to protect its malware secrets.
Conventional weapons such as missiles may be fired at the enemy (i.e. into an unsecured area). Proximity to or impact with the target detonates the ordnance including its classified parts. Hence military personnel do not violate classification rules by firing ordnance with classified parts.
Ordnance will likely explode. If it does not, that is not the operator's intent.
Over the last decade U.S. hacking operations have been increasingly dressed up in military jargon to tap into Department of Defense funding streams.
For instance, attempted "malware injections" (commercial jargon) or "implant drops" (NSA jargon) are being called "fires" as if a weapon was being fired.
However the analogy is questionable.
Unlike bullets, bombs or missiles, most CIA malware is designed to live for days or even years after it has reached its 'target'. CIA malware does not "explode on impact" but rather permanently infests its target. In order to infect target's device, copies of the malware must be placed on the target's devices, giving physical possession of the malware to the target.
To exfiltrate data back to the CIA or to await further instructions the malware must communicate with CIA Command & Control (C2) systems placed on internet connected servers.
But such servers are typically not approved to hold classified information, so CIA command and control systems are also made unclassified.
A successful 'attack' on a target's computer system is more like a series of complex stock maneuvers in a hostile take-over bid or the careful planting of rumors in order to gain control over an organization's leadership rather than the firing of a weapons system.
If there is a military analogy to be made, the infestation of a target is perhaps akin to the execution of a whole series of military maneuvers against the target's territory including observation, infiltration, occupation and exploitation.
Evading forensics and anti-virus
A series of standards lay out CIA malware infestation patterns which are likely to assist forensic crime scene investigators as well as, Apple
  1. Microsoft
  2. Google
  3. Samsung
  4. Nokia
  5. Blackberry
  6. Siemens
  7. anti-virus companies,
...attribute and defend against attacks.
"Tradecraft DO's and DON'Ts" contains CIA rules on how its malware should be written to avoid fingerprints implicating the "CIA, US government, or its witting partner companies" in "forensic review".
Similar secret standards cover the, use of encryption to hide CIA hacker and malware communication (pdf) describing targets & exfiltrated data (pdf) executing payloads (pdf) persisting (pdf), ...in the target's machines over time.
CIA hackers developed successful attacks against most well known anti-virus programs.
These are documented in, AV defeats Personal Security Products Detecting and defeating PSPs PSP/DebuggeRE Avoidance For example, Comodo was defeated by CIA malware placing itself in the Window's "Recycle Bin". While Comodo 6.x has a "Gaping Hole of DOOM".
CIA hackers discussed what the NSA's "Equation Group" hackers did wrong and how the CIA's malware makers could avoid similar exposure.

Examples

The CIA's Engineering Development Group (EDG) management system contains around 500 different projects (only some of which are documented by "Year Zero") each with their own sub-projects, malware and hacker tools.
The majority of these projects relate to tools that are used for,
penetration infestation ("implanting") control exfiltration
Another branch of development focuses on the development and operation of Listening Posts (LP) and Command and Control (C2) systems used to communicate with and control CIA implants.
Special projects are used to target specific hardware from routers to smart TVs.
Some example projects are described below, but see the table of contents for the full list of projects described by WikiLeaks' "Year Zero".
UMBRAGE
The CIA's hand crafted hacking techniques pose a problem for the agency.
Each technique it has created forms a "fingerprint" that can be used by forensic investigators to attribute multiple different attacks to the same entity.
This is analogous to finding the same distinctive knife wound on multiple separate murder victims. The unique wounding style creates suspicion that a single murderer is responsible.
As soon one murder in the set is solved then the other murders also find likely attribution.
The CIA's Remote Devices Branch's UMBRAGE group collects and maintains a substantial library of attack techniques 'stolen' from malware produced in other states including the Russian Federation.
With UMBRAGE and related projects the CIA cannot only increase its total number of attack types but also misdirect attribution by leaving behind the "fingerprints" of the groups that the attack techniques were stolen from.
UMBRAGE components cover,
keyloggers
  1. password collection
  2. webcam capture
  3. data destruction
  4. persistence
  5. privilege escalation
  6. stealth
  7. anti-virus (PSP) avoidance
  8. survey techniques

Fine Dining
Fine Dining comes with a standardized questionnaire i.e menu that CIA case officers fill out.
The questionnaire is used by the agency's OSB (Operational Support Branch) to transform the requests of case officers into technical requirements for hacking attacks (typically "exfiltrating" information from computer systems) for specific operations.
The questionnaire allows the OSB to identify how to adapt existing tools for the operation, and communicate this to CIA malware configuration staff.
The OSB functions as the interface between CIA operational staff and the relevant technical support staff.
Among the list of possible targets of the collection are,
  • 'Asset'
  • 'Liason Asset'
  • 'System Administrator'
  • 'Foreign Information Operations'
  • 'Foreign Intelligence Agencies'
  • 'Foreign Government Entities'
Notably absent is any reference to extremists or transnational criminals. The 'Case Officer' is also asked to specify the environment of the target like the type of computer, operating system used, Internet connectivity and installed anti-virus utilities (PSPs) as well as a list of file types to be exfiltrated like Office documents, audio, video, images or custom file types.
The 'menu' also asks for information if recurring access to the target is possible and how long unobserved access to the computer can be maintained.
This information is used by the CIA's 'JQJIMPROVISE' software (see below) to configure a set of CIA malware suited to the specific needs of an operation.
Improvise (JQJIMPROVISE)
  1. 'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector
  2. selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like,
  3. Windows (Bartender)
  4. MacOS (JukeBox)
  5. Linux (DanceFloor)
  6. Its configuration utilities like Margarita allows the NOC (Network Operation Center) to customize tools
based on requirements from 'Fine Dining' questionnaires.
HIVE
HIVE is a multi-platform CIA malware suite and its associated control software.
The project provides customizable implants for Windows, Solaris, MikroTik (used in internet routers) and Linux platforms and a Listening Post (LP)/Command and Control (C2) infrastructure to communicate with these implants.
The implants are configured to communicate via HTTPS with the webserver of a cover domain; each operation utilizing these implants has a separate cover domain and the infrastructure can handle any number of cover domains.
Each cover domain resolves to an IP address that is located at a commercial VPS (Virtual Private Server) provider.
The public-facing server forwards all incoming traffic via a VPN to a 'Blot' server that handles actual connection requests from clients.
It is setup for optional SSL client authentication: if a client sends a valid client certificate (only implants can do that), the connection is forwarded to the 'Honeycomb' toolserver that communicates with the implant.
If a valid certificate is missing (which is the case if someone tries to open the cover domain website by accident), the traffic is forwarded to a cover server that delivers an unsuspicious looking website.
The Honeycomb toolserver receives exfiltrated information from the implant; an operator can also task the implant to execute jobs on the target computer, so the toolserver acts as a C2 (command and control) server for the implant.
Similar functionality (though limited to Windows) is provided by the RickBobby project.
See the classified user and developer guides for HIVE.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why now?
WikiLeaks published as soon as its verification and analysis were ready. In February the Trump administration has issued an Executive Order calling for a "Cyberwar" review to be prepared within 30 days.
While the review increases the timeliness and relevance of the publication it did not play a role in setting the publication date.
Redactions
Names, email addresses and external IP addresses have been redacted in the released pages (70,875 redactions in total) until further analysis is complete. Over-redaction: Some items may have been redacted that are not employees, contractors, targets or otherwise related to the agency, but are, for example, authors of documentation for otherwise public projects that are used by the agency.
Identity vs. person: the redacted names are replaced by user IDs (numbers) to allow readers to assign multiple pages to a single author. Given the redaction process used a single person may be represented by more than one assigned identifier but no identifier refers to more than one real person.
Archive attachments (zip, tar.gz, ...), are replaced with a PDF listing all the file names in the archive. As the archive content is assessed it may be made available; until then the archive is redacted.
Attachments with other binary content, are replaced by a hex dump of the content to prevent accidental invocation of binaries that may have been infected with weaponized CIA malware. As the content is assessed it may be made available; until then the content is redacted.
Tens of thousands of routable IP addresses references, (including more than 22 thousand within the United States) that correspond to possible targets, CIA covert listening post servers, intermediary and test systems, are redacted for further exclusive investigation.
Binary files of non-public origin, are only available as dumps to prevent accidental invocation of CIA malware infected binaries.
Organizational Chart
The organizational chart (far above image) corresponds to the material published by WikiLeaks so far.
Since the organizational structure of the CIA below the level of Directorates is not public, the placement of the EDG and its branches within the org chart of the agency is reconstructed from information contained in the documents released so far.
It is intended to be used as a rough outline of the internal organization; please be aware that the reconstructed org chart is incomplete and that internal reorganizations occur frequently.
Wiki pages
"Year Zero" contains 7818 web pages with 943 attachments from the internal development groupware. The software used for this purpose is called Confluence, a proprietary software from Atlassian.
Webpages in this system (like in Wikipedia) have a version history that can provide interesting insights on how a document evolved over time; the 7818 documents include these page histories for 1136 latest versions.
The order of named pages within each level is determined by date (oldest first). Page content is not present if it was originally dynamically created by the Confluence software (as indicated on the re-constructed page).
What time period is covered?
The years 2013 to 2016. The sort order of the pages within each level is determined by date (oldest first).
WikiLeaks has obtained the CIA's creation/last modification date for each page but these do not yet appear for technical reasons. Usually the date can be discerned or approximated from the content and the page order.
If it is critical to know the exact time/date contact WikiLeaks.
What is "Vault 7"
"Vault 7" is a substantial collection of material about CIA activities obtained by WikiLeaks.
When was each part of "Vault 7" obtained?
Part one was obtained recently and covers through 2016. Details on the other parts will be available at the time of publication.
Is each part of "Vault 7" from a different source?
Details on the other parts will be available at the time of publication.
What is the total size of "Vault 7"?
The series is the largest intelligence publication in history.
How did WikiLeaks obtain each part of "Vault 7"?
Sources trust WikiLeaks to not reveal information that might help identify them.
Isn't WikiLeaks worried that the CIA will act against its staff to stop the series?
No. That would be certainly counter-productive.
Has WikiLeaks already 'mined' all the best stories?
No. WikiLeaks has intentionally not written up hundreds of impactful stories to encourage others to find them and so create expertise in the area for subsequent parts in the series. They're there.
Look. Those who demonstrate journalistic excellence may be considered for early access to future parts.
Won't other journalists find all the best stories before me?
Unlikely. There are very considerably more stories than there are journalists or academics who are in a position to write them.
submitted by CuteBananaMuffin to conspiracy [link] [comments]

[MtF] Coming Out

I came out to most almost a year after starting HRT over the course of several months. These are my notes about how I decided that it was the right time for me, how I did it, lessons learned, tips I wish I had known when I started, and what I wish I could have told myself at the start.
This is one entry in a series of posts drawn out of notes and journal entries. A link to all of the posts can be found in my transition journey.
As with all my posts, this is comprised of notes from my journey, from someone that knew something was off since childhood and transitioned well past puberty had done its thing. Your journey will be different, YMMV applies to this community more than most, and there is no right or wrong way.
There are many different ways to come out, this was just my experience and yours can and will be very different.

Coming out

There is no rule that says you have to come out to anyone or that you have to come out to everyone. Alternatively, you can pick and choose who you come out to. You might tell friends and family, but not tell your work and just start a new job as the new you. It is up to you to decide who needs to know.
If and when you do come out you are not asking their opinion, you are letting them know what is going on.
If coming out feels like a confession and you are seeking acceptance and understanding you want to shift away from that to one where you are just letting them know what is going on. They will or won't be accepting and you have no say in that. Coming out is not about gaining acceptance.
You might lose some friends, but you will probably be gaining some new ones like any transition in life such as when you move, change school/jobs, have kids, etc. Some will be accepting, some won't be, some will take time. Some will go through the seven stages of grief. Some might be open and happy for you, but months later they will stop inviting you to events. Some might hit on you.

My "plan"

From the start my plan was delay telling others until after I was male failing. To be clear male failing is one person on the street seeing a woman from just a glance at me, not everyone, not all the time. This started happening occasionally between month 9 and 11. Around month 10 even those that saw me frequently started noticing and would ask what's up. That occurring is what caused me to create a more firm schedule for coming out socially.
Of course, this plan makes for an annoying catch 22

The bell curve of when others notice

There was no magic day where everyone's brain flip how they gender you. Some flip early, some flip late, some you have to explicitly tell as they will never figure it out. Unfortunately the time span of this bell curve isn't measured in days or weeks, but months from my experience.
Another woman I work with that had transitioned years before (and was open about the fact) figured it out crazy early, but was incredibly polite and didn't say a thing until I approached her for advice.
Those that have seen other individuals transition were able to spot my transition. Lack of facial hair and early changes to my voice stand out to them. The first unexpected person to figure it out that I came out to was one of these individuals. Later I found out there were several more that knew for over a year, but were all polite until I formally came out.
Those I interacted with the most were the last to notice my changes and they were not the first to gender me correctly. I call this boiling the frog or gender warping and the result is that they had the hardest time.
On the flip side, those that have never seen me before at shops and restaurants consistently would see me as a woman even when those at work that saw me every day had "no clue".
Different people gender individuals differently, placing different importance on different things from appearance to voice to smell. With the face it might be the skin tone, nose shape, or brow ridge that is the most important, you just don't know how any one's brain genders.
When a few people started noticing I was all excited to come out, but really the lesson I learned the hard way was that I needed to slow down. I was at the beginning of the curve. Just because a few figured it out doesn't mean most would and being told that 'they never would have guessed' because they still see a guy hurts. The longer I waited the less common that reaction was.
To further highlight the "speed" here are some dates to show how long I waited to come out at work compared to when I first started to be seen as a woman in public.

Deciding when to come out

Originally I was going to wait to tell most until after I had FFS which was scheduled for month 16, but a few were figuring it out at month 10 and I really didn’t want to wait.
In the end, I told very close friends first, immediate family, and worked my way out in my social circle saving coming out formally at work for last and so there wasn't a specific day I told everyone, but it happened many times over the course of around three months.
Because I wanted to tell people in person there was a time period where some knew, but others did not which gets annoying and was a little depressing at times.

Switching pronouns and name

I held off asking those that knew really early on to switch to use my new name and female pronouns until I was male failing and told a wider circle of friends. I did not want to live through others trying when I was clearly still presenting male which would result in me getting constantly misgendered not to mention someone slipping up around someone that did not know. It was just too messy and this was easier socially even if it was sad for me.
I did ask those that never interact with others to switch my name and pronouns immediately such as the woman that I went to for laser, which made my visits amazing. In fact, she never knew me by my deadname and one day I left smiling when I told her my deadname in a conversation and she said it was weird. I never "came out" to those individuals, they only ever knew me as the new me which was great.

1 minute coming out speech

Before I came out officially at work a handful of people figured it out. One even asked me my name/pronouns and told me later they assumed they had missed the announcement. I realized that I needed something for these cases where someone approaches unexpectedly. I put together a little speech that I can say in a minute that hits all the bullet points that I kept on my phone.

Don't beat around the bush

Early on (month 10-11) there were a few people that figured out what was going on, but didn't say anything. If you realize this is happening don't beat around the bush or play coy games to see if they can figure it out. It is much better all around to just be upfront and tell them that you are transgender, transitioning, and give the above 1 minute coming out speech. Don't turn it into a long awkward thing.
My apologies to the person that I did this to before I had the 1 minute coming out speech and was still terrified of telling people and really wanted them to figure it out and say something first. If you are really sure they know, just tell them.

Shorter is better

It is tempting when coming out to want to sit down and share everything that you have been keeping quiet about. Further, there can be a desire to convince them and seek validation. Long term though you want to try to stick more to the 1 minute speech and less the 1 hour discussion. Many of the things you share you will later wish you never had.

A one liner is also okay

One person I came out to really early on I did it in an off handed way. They overheard something with my new name and so I told them that I will be going by a new name in a month or two and that I am transgender. That was it, no further conversation was had. I simply told them of a change in my life, like it was exciting as buying a new winter coat or something. In a way, I think I liked this way of coming out more than anything else because they immediately switched and life moved on without a big drawn out event.

Coming out lessons

Guidelines I have learned the hard way.
Do not under any circumstances assume that the person you are coming out to is supportive. There are countless stories of being surprised at how others react. They might call you by your new name to your face, but never anyone else. They might be supportive say you are brave, but gossip about you negatively to their friends. Be especially watchful of those that might be openly hostile to you.
With each coming out the overall lesson I learned was to tell less.

Who needs science

Before I came out I had a list of scientific articles and was ready and happy to discuss it in greater detail with anyone that wanted to. To my surprise, everyone either was just happy that I was happy or had already made up their mind and wasn't really interested in that sort of discussion.

Telling parents

My parents lived nearby and so I made sure to regularly see them so it wouldn't be a jarring visit with me looking different. I had spent months crafting a letter to give to them. The letter served several roles. First and foremost it was to articulate what is going on in as clear of a way as possible as well as answer the most common questions they might have. Beyond that, I knew that when I left their house they would still have this letter and use it as a FAQ of sorts to be able to go back and see what I had written.
When the day actually came they told me that while they didn't really understand they still loved me. I regularly went back and hung out with them so they could see that I am still me. On the second visit it there was a lot more questions and push back to the point that they were trying to debate how I felt when I was a child as though they might know better than me. No matter what I felt about that, I calmly let them talk because I could see what they were doing and I know that this is all new for them and it will take some time. I kept going back, each time being calm and as time went and they learned more they seemed to became more accepting and supportive.
Family is family and giving them time to adjust and not giving up I felt was the right thing to do. When I came out I wasn’t wearing a dress and was still presenting androgynous, but each time they saw me after I slowly changed my presentation. Not only could they adjust to my presentation, but HRT continued to do its slow magic, and each time I was more feminine. I don't have a magic solution for dealing with parents, but I am being much more patient than I am with anyone else.
If I have to cut a family member out of my life I want to know that I first did everything possible to maintain our relationship.

Acceptance and Support

When asked how others are responding to me coming out I like to describe in terms of acceptance and support as two separate axis on a graph. I have those that are supportive, but not accepting, those that are not accepting and not supportive, and those that are supportive and accepting and everything in the middle.
For many that are not accepting it is because they are not informed. They make a million assumptions based on what little information they have seen in the media. Simply talking to them helps bring to light a lot of these misconceptions and can move that axis.

Its all about sexuality right???

Some individuals have a really really hard time separating sexuality from gender. They will bring the conversations constantly back to that topic and they just can't conceive that I am not doing this for sexual reasons. When I discuss my transition it is almost never about sexuality and every time they bring it up I clarify and move the conversation elsewhere. I try to discuss sexuality as little as possible because I want to send a clear message that it is not part of the conversation. Sometimes I have to be as blunt as I am willing about this topic as they might have just insane ideas.

People talk

Do not trust that people won't talk. Assume if you tell someone they will tell someone else. Someone at my work figured it out and told his wife (via chat on his phone) before we even finished my coming out conversation. Within the world of gossip, this ranks insanely high. If someone asks if you are going through something early on you can just say 'personal stuff' and leave it at that, you do not have to tell anyone before you are ready. There are plenty of stories where someone came out to a friend or supposed ally only to find out that they told everyone. Even though I was prepared for it when it happened to me it took me by surprise. Even telling another trans individual doesn't guarantee they won't talk.
The safest thing is to not tell anyone until you are ready for everyone to know.
On the flip side, this can be used for coming out at work, the neighborhood, etc. Tell the person that gossips and just stand back. Or tell a close group and let them know it is not a secret and you plan on formally coming out in a few weeks. They will talk and when you "come out" it won't surprise many. It will be news for a few weeks and then people will hopefully move on. Cis individuals by and large don't understand how serious outing you is.
As for myself those that are closest to me would almost always tell their spouses shortly after I told them. Friends, family, boss, acquaintances, at each level of the circle, the possibility of someone telling everyone grows. It is really juicy gossip from their perspective and not a medical or safety issue like it is to us.

Delay until next week

When going through the process of telling everyone if you delay telling an individual a week it is only better. As I started coming out more and more events were conspiring as they do, to delay things. That might have been telling a neighbor or getting my name changed or telling an extended family member. In each case I really wanted to do it yesterday, but also took a breath and didn't worry about it. The important thing was that it was going to happen. And in fact, the extra week or month was actually a positive thing. A few more weeks for HRT to do its thing, for me to work on my voice, wardrobe, facial hair, everything. So I didn't stress when I realized something I originally was hoping to do at month 11 would happen at month 13. This happened a number of times and in each case, I was simply more prepared in the end. I started not trying to cram everything as close together as possible, but just tell those when the time is best.

And then ... nothing

I told the majority of individuals over the course of two months. Not too surprisingly very quickly it became yesterday's news, but what was more interesting was how the news wasn't timely. I wasn't going to a family wedding, high school reunion, or similar. If I had waited another month or three to start telling everyone it would have been okay.

Work

I told my boss when a few early individuals started to figure it out just in case something happened and I wanted him to be in my corner, but this was months before actually coming out at work. At the same time I reached out to HR so that they would be in the loop both for my own documentation/legal purposes and if they wanted to help. I am not sure if they were unprepared or if I live in a more liberal state than I realized because the response was only a link to the documentation on how to change my name in the various corporate systems.
I delayed the general announcement until almost 14 months. I was full time everywhere except work and itching to be me at work too, but given that it is my income, how I pay for food and housing I played it very safe. It was only once I had my legal name change and needed to update my name for payroll that I decided to come out at work. My face had changed enough that after I came out I was told one person said: "about time".
I crafted a simple email that my director sent out. It was in the style of a new hire email just a photo and an introduction. Not only did having them send it out give it authority behind the announcement, but they got to use the female pronouns in the email when referring to me. I also had a long legal type HR email ready in case we needed to send it to anyone in specific if there was trouble.
The email that went out was very short, just a few paragraphs that covered the following points:
I told my immediate colleagues before the mass email went out because I consider them my friends and because they saw me almost every day they didn't realize I had been changing and were surprised. After the announcement I got to go around changing my name and photo in various systems and got a new badge all on the same day.
I received a lot of congratulatory emails and then after a few hours I was just back to doing work. It took a few days for the news to filter out and over the next few days others kept finding out and either stopping by and saying hi or sending me an email.
I work in a casual environment and the day after coming out I switched my wardrobe, but to help others adjust kept it more on the androgynous style with jeans and t-shirts to start. I had been hiding my chest fairly well so trading my compression bras and large sweaters for tops that fit and a regular bra resulted in a fair number of stares for a few days. As the weeks went by I slowly started introducing more femme pieces and wearing jewelry.
In the end coming out at work went better than I expected. There were a few name and pronoun mistakes, but as time went on that decreased and work continued on as it had before. Seeking feedback on how it went someone told me that when I am not around they switched to my new name which made my day to hear.

Work and sexual discussions

Discussing what it means to be transgender has a lot of topics that are sexual in nature. Be extraordinarily careful about what you say or do as you might actually be reported to HR because it makes someone uncomfortable. Have conversations in private areas because individuals that eavesdrop in publicly held conversations area might also report you. Because the nature of coming out, stuff normally not discussed day to day at work is. Extra care should be taken to not put your job in jeopardy as you navigate answering those that have questions.

Outer circle

There are a number of individuals that I would classify as on the outer circle. They know me from before, but I infrequently interact with them. These include places like my dentist, hairdresser, eye doctor, library. An option you have at any time is to just go somewhere else. The new place won't have that baggage of you having to come out to them or the possibility of being misgendered like those that need to adjust. I kept going to many of the same places, but if I had to do it over this might choose differently both to get the validation and have one less thing to stress over.

Account and Names

Working in software I know just how dangerous it can be to ask to have a name updated. It is very common that the old name isn't deleted or changed, but there is just some note saying the new name is X, but the original name is still there or the name is just copied from one system to the next. Even if you think you updated everything eventually something screws up and the first name in the account is used. So even if it was a bit more work whenever possible I created a new account and then deleted the old account so there would be no chance for the old name to be accidentally used down the road. This applied for big things like Facebook, but also to little things like online purchases from places like Etsy and even my library card.
A good example is Amazon.com where your name is copied all over the place rather than having a single account holder and so you will be playing whack a mole trying to find all the places your old name is used if you continue using your old account.
As I would come out to others when it applied I would tell them about my new accounts and switch communicating with them exclusively there.
I highly recommend when possible creating new accounts and deleting the old ones.

Telling others your deadname

When you first come out, everyone knows your deadname, but from then on you will start meeting people who don't know your deadname but might know you are trans. The moment these individuals learn what your deadname is they often will feel compelled to say it out loud, almost like they are trying it on to see how it fit you. This experience never once has felt good. Like coming out, you can never undo telling someone your deadname. Worst of all they can (and sometimes will) tell others what it was. But overall after experiencing this a few too many times I no longer tell someone my deadname even when asked saying I wouldn't be comfortable telling them and dropping it. If they find out through some other means that is okay, but there is no reason for me to volunteer that.

Social Media

Coming out on Facebook, LinkedIn, Reddit and similar places was the very last major thing I was planning on doing. In preparation for that, I had scrubbed photos of myself from the internet, created new email addresses, and took a new "stock" photo of myself to use as a profile photo everywhere.

Facebook

I always assumed I would have a big coming out message on Facebook. But as it got closer and closer to when I thought I might do that I realized I didn't really need to do that. Facebook just has a collection of individuals I knew over the last decade, not my close friends. And what did I really have to gain by posting there? Anyone I wanted to tell I told in person and they were now friends on my new account. And then I looked over my friend's list and realized that a number had actually deleted their account. Facebook isn't used like it once was. I could just delete my old Facebook account without an announcement and it wouldn't be a big deal.

Accepting at first, but...

Some individuals are very accepting at first, but on the second or third time, you see them they are less so even to the point of being hostile. Unfortunately, those same individuals can come off as extremely supportive at first and it is very tempting to open up to them. Because of this, I switched to holding back initially and only open up over time as I learned I could trust them.

For some I have been transitioning for only a few months ...

I came out to most people between months 9 and 14. Some told me they started noticing and suspected something was up as early as month 8. While I might have been living with this since I was a child, seriously dealing with it for several years and I have been on HRT for more than a year to them it is very new. I would even go as far as saying some think I have been transitioning for only a few months.

Ways that I outed my transition before coming out

Some of the things I did before coming out made it much more obvious I was transitioning. I wrote down what other people told me they noticed. If I had ever seriously worried about my job as income or wanted to go stealth by quitting my job and starting over in a new city these are things I should not have done.
In summary, if you want a group of people to not know you are transitioning don’t be stupid, just don’t start socially transitioning in front of them.

How-old.net

Before coming out at work I admit that I submitted way to many photos to how-old.net to see how I was being gendered. It had the addictive nature that initially only occasionally would it rewarded me by saying I looked female, but as time went on more and more were being marked as female. A big reason I was using it was as a gauge for when I could come out. But after coming out I found myself no longer using it because it didn't matter. If the site saw me as male or female it didn't help me at all because I was now out.

That photo where I am fat

I lived a life before I transitioned and pretending I didn't is silly. Within that lifetime I took photos and videos, wrote articles for publications, gave talks and much more. I don't want to pretend that this never happened.
Someone told me it is like I have an old vacation photo that I love, but I happened to be fat during that time. I loved that experience, don't want to pretend it never happened, but just don't care to show anyone the photo because of how I looked. I have used this allegory a few times to good success to explain to others how I feel about old photos or places that still have my old name.

Being screwed over

Someone will screw you over. You just don't know who it will be. Perhaps they will decide that it is their business to tell everyone sooner than you were planning. Maybe they will find you offensive and cause you problems on social media or at work. Maybe they will stir the pot on purpose to cause issues in your relationship. Maybe they will call you sir or deadname and misgender you in every single sentence just to voice their opinion. You don't know who it will be, but be prepared and try not to engage with them and be defensive in every single person you come out to.
And just to make it extra challenging they might be accepting and supportive in the first conversation, but only in the second conversation does it becomes clear that they are not an ally.
Most of the people I told were very supportive and accepting, but there were those few that I surprised me at their behavior and if I had to guess at the start I never would have said it would have been them. You just don't know who it will be.

Misgendering

The best advice seems to be for those that know you have changed, but are misgendering you is to be firm, calm and consistent in correcting people from the very start. Correcting with a single word, completely neutrally in tone with no explanation and move one without waiting for a response.
I practiced with a close friend when the day came for them to switch. Explicitly telling them I needed to practice worked out great for both of us because they would still use the old name and pronouns from habit and I needed to build up the reflex of calling it out while knowing that they wont attack me.
For those that don't know you the best advice I have heard is to act confused and be confident in your gender like any cis individual would behave.
At work record down on paper when it happens in case you need to give it to HR down the road.
A pattern I have seen happen is that many individuals are very good with names and pronouns for a short while (the first or second time after I tell them), but later on when it was not on the forefront of their mind that they made mistakes. At first I was excited at how easy it seem to be for everyone to switch, but they all started accidentally using my deadname. Now I realize that when it was less at the front of their mind they were much more likely to make mistakes until the new name became habit. I never thought that they were being malicious (usually that is very obvious) but realized that it will just take some time to switch their automatic behavior.

Pronouns for before

When asked what pronouns should be used when telling old stories I didn't have a good answer and initially let the question slide. When thinking about myself in the past I would see someone presenting male and it was a bit confusing. By not clarify an answer to this question I noticed a few things:
Switching back and forth just makes it harder for everyone, especially parents to retrain themselves.
As time went on and as I looked more feminine, was read and treated as a woman day in and day out, having other people use my deadname and use male pronouns hurt more each time.
While they often ask about talking about stories when you were six it hurts way more when they are talking about you from just a few years ago while using your deadname and male pronouns.
Something I couldn't articulate at the time, but u/nubivagance did very well with this comment:
I've always looked at this from a linguistic perspective. Pronouns and names serve the purpose of designating who you are referring to right now in the moment. Even when talking about the past, you are still indicating "there, that person. This is about them" linguistically. In that way, using a person's old name doesn't make sense. You are referring to a person who goes by X so using Y to refer to them doesn't make sense and will only serve to confuse the message you are trying to convey with words.
What I should have said from the start was that unless the fact that I was presenting male is relevant to the story to not mention it otherwise they should say "when [name|our daughter] was pre transition" and keep on using female pronouns.
While I understood how much harder switching pronouns when talking about memories, over time I expect everyone to switch.

Overall

Overall coming out went way better than I was expecting it would. I had really low expectations and many individuals surprised me. There were a number of cases where those that I was sure would be a problem were a strong ally in the end and those that I assumed would be an ally were unexpectedly nasty. You just don't know until you tell them. The vast majority of individuals switched to my new name and life moved on.
In every coming out conversation the topic of me becoming a "completely different person" would come up. It didn’t see to matter what I said and it seems like it was only once they got to see with their own eyes that I was pretty much the same person after going full time did they believe me.
I had a fair amount of anxiety around not knowing how it would turn out was and it was a big relief once everyone knew.
While I initially wanted to do it in one big moment spreading it out and delaying a week or month here and there was not a big deal and I don’t regret a single instance where I had to wait to tell someone. The same goes for clothes, rather than switching in a big bang, slowly shifting what I wore of the course of several months worked very well, both to help make everyone comfortable, but also to help give myself more time to build up a wardrobe.
Would I have had the same experience if I had come out earlier or later? That is something I can never know and I could probably make arguments for and against coming out at a different time, but at the end of the day, this is what I was comfortable with and worked well for me. I know there are others that come out pre-HRT or never and that is cool too, the point being that they came out when they wanted and felt ready.

Validation

One year later (At 2+ years HRT) one evening I went to my parent's house for the first time in a long time and they misgendered me and deadnamed me all evening. It didn't seem malicious, just habitual and I corrected them each time. They had been good in the past so the behavior was a little surprising, but what was truly surprising was how I felt about it. When I first came out the approval and validation of others (including my parents) meant a lot to me. Transitioning is a big scary choice and I was looking for support. When someone would disapprove or misgender me it would hurt. As time marched on I gained a lot of self confidence in who I am and I discovered that their behavior didn't phase me because I no longer needed that validation. It was disappointing, but I didn't go home and cry or anything. What it really taught me was just how much validation was tied up in my coming out.
As you come out to others be aware of your own confidence and how that can play into the situation. Over explaining, trying to convince with science, and being hurt and distraught when they just don't understand. (Cis individuals not understanding what it feels like to be trans? shocker!) No matter how sure I was about being trans at the time I was still insecure and that made coming out much harder than it needed to be.

Reflecting on how I came out 2 years later

On the internet people like to obsess over the question: "what is a woman". I might know I am a woman in the same way I know I am right handed, but in the eyes of other people, I am only a woman because they now see a woman and treat me like other women. Once I realized this had happened I become very bitter because it just further reinforces that you only are what you look like. This caused me to question everything I did when I came out because clearly very little of what I said actually mattered, all that mattered what how I looked to them.
When I came out I was itching to be me full time and tell everyone everything, so I might have ignored any advice, and I still can't say it it is any better than what I did, but if I could go back I would tell myself the following:

What to tell

As little as possible
I told people so much personal and private stuff that they had no need to know and I can't take back. If I tried to justify it by saying I was convincing them, I now know that was pointless and just waited would accomplish that better. And it didn't matter! Coming out isn't about validation or acceptance or any of that, but about telling them what is going on and nothing more. I knew who I was, that is the reason I was doing this.
A few conversations could have been in-depth, but the vast, vast majority of conversations only needed the bullet points I listed in my work email, and in some cases I could have done even less.

Who to tell

Fewer people
When I started I was under the impression I had two choices, go stealth like those in the 80's/90's and reset my life or alternatively because it is 2020 and people are more accepting, tell everyone, post it all over social media and more.
It isn't so binary, you can tell all your friends personally, but you don't have to come out on social media. You can also wait to switch your name at work until you start a new job. A few key choices can result in needing to come out to dramatically fewer people.
No, every neighbor didn't need to be personally told. No, I didn't have to tell my hairdresser. No, the friend at work who was leaving shortly before I came out didn't need to know.

When to tell

Later is better
I know waiting is really hard. I remember crying in bed at only 3 months on HRT knowing I could not socially transition yet when I knew to my core this was right. I stick by my choice of waiting until I male failed, but I would say to wait another 6-9 months after that to get through as much of the androgynous phase as possible. Then again maybe if I had simply told less I would be happier with when came out.

Next

After a lifetime of imagining what it would be like, preparing, waiting, and finally coming out I finally start living full time as a woman and starting to experience the trials and tribulations that entails.
submitted by 2d4d_data to TransProTips [link] [comments]

Simple Authenticated Confidential Communication via IOTA

TL;DR -- I'm putting this at the top. I explore the use of well-known and widely used cryptographic primitives to communicate securely over the IOTA network.
I have been considering a method by which users might message one another across the IOTA network, but with said method meeting certain criteria.
I believe I have a method that will work, modeled after existing protocols for secure communications over insecure channels, and I am in the process of building a very rudimentary prototype in Rust. Please do not expect much more than a basic proof of concept, which I will describe below. This prototype is partially complete now but needs more work before I put it on GitHub. It is days to weeks away. A description of the protocol and of the program follows, during and after which I will explore some of the strengths and weaknesses in this approach.
I will begin with an example using the usual players in such scenarios. I will make some side comments where they seem appropriate.
Alice: A friend of Bob who wishes to communicate with him.
Bob: A friend of Alice who is waiting for a message from Alice. He knows her message will require a reply, and he intends to send one.
Eve: A troublemaker with modest resources and considerable skill. She has her own reasons, but she is interested in disrupting, corrupting, or forging communications between Alice and Bob.
Before our story begins, Alice has generated a secret number. It is on the order of 110 trytes long. Bob has done the same. These are base 27 representations of numbers randomly generated using a cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator that, in binary, are within the range of 0 and 2521 - 1. As these are their secret keys, Alice has not shared hers with anyone. Neither has Bob shared his with anyone.
Alice uses her private key to calculate a public key on the secp521r elliptic curve with all the standard parameters as defined for that curve. To do this, she performs scalar multiplication of the base point of the curve, within the finite field, by her secret key / number. There are algorithms that can perform this multiplication, even by a 110 tryte long number, in a very short time. There are no satisfactory algorithms outside quantum computers for reversing this process.
My choice of the secp521r curve is somewhat arbitrary here except in its size. An Edwards curve would be better, but I have begun with a Weierstrass curve for now as I understand them better. Regarding the size of this curve, I point out one glaring weakness in this protocol, and that is that it is not quantum secure. However, because a quantum computer's ability to solve discrete logarithm problems is heavily dependent on the number of cubits available to it, a secp521r key should remain uncompromised for some time even after the more popular secp256k1 has fallen. The latter curve would be the proverbial canary in the coal mine, a time to transition to another public key system here.
Like Alice, Bob has calculated his public key, and he and Alice have exchange their public keys.
The keys could be exchanged directly between Alice and Bob, or they could be hosted by a key server. Possibly such a decentralized key server could be set up on the IOTA network itself. But for now, we will leave the exchange of keys aside and proceed with the understanding that it has been handled.
Now Alice and Bob generate a common IOTA seed pair as follows. Alice takes Bob's public key which, as we have seen, is a point he calculated on the secp521r curve, and she multiplies this point by her private key to compute another point on the curve. Bob takes Alice's public key and multiplies it by her private key to compute another point on the curve as well. The final point Alice computed is the same as the final point Bob computed.
We can see this simply enough if we call Alice's private key A and her public key a, and likewise Bob's private key B and public key b. Then A * b = B * a because a was base point g * A, and b was base point g * B, so Alice calculated the final point as A * (B * g) and Bob calculated it as B * (A * g). Therefore because multiplication is associative even on an elliptic curve in a finite field, they both arrived, by completely different paths, at the same final point, which we will call P.
Eve was able to monitor the exchange of keys. But as she only has public keys a and b, she cannot calculate P without solving the discrete logarithm problem. No method has been found to do this efficiently outside of quantum computing.
The above is a playing out of Diffie Hellman Elliptic Curve key agreement
Finally, Alice and Bob each used P to find 2 IOTA seed values. To do this, each used a suitable hash function such as Keccak-384 or Blake2-384 to hash the X coordinate and the Y coordinate of P. Each coordinate is hashed separately, producing a 384 bit output for each coordinate. The maximum value of a 384 bit number is very close to, but less than, the maximum value of an 81 tryte number. Therefore any output from the hash function -- I prefer Blake2 above because it is not associated with NIST for those concerned about such things -- will map to an IOTA seed without truncation. Some IOTA seed values would be outside the bounds of the hash output, but this shrinkage of the IOTA key space is small enough that it should not be cause for concern.
These hash outputs, which we will call Px and Py, now converted to trytes, are Alice and Bob's IOTA seeds. The two seeds are useful for two way communications without cross talk, but Alice and Bob need to decide who will use Px and who will use Py, even without speaking to one another about it. Neither channel is better than the other, and indeed it may be beneficial to all participants if each is sometimes Px and sometimes Py simply to introduce randomness into the system.
To do this, Alice hashes the X coordinate of her public key to produce H(ax), and she hashes the X coordinate of Bob's public key as well to produce H(bx). She now XORs each of these hashes with Py. If H(ax) XOR Py < H(bx) XOR Py then Alice will use Px for her seed. Otherwise she will use Py and leave Px for Bob. Bob has both public keys as well and performs the same computation. Alice and Bob have agreed who will use which channel based on no more communication than exchange of public keys.
Now Alice prepares to message Bob. In the channel determination above, she was assigned Px and Bob Py, which as we will see soon means that she transmits TO (not FROM) that channel. Alice now prepares her message. It must be small enough to fit inside a single IOTA transaction, but this is still larger than a Tweet or text message. When she is done, she provides the program her private key, Bob's public key, and the message itself.
The program computes all of the values above. Additionally, it generates a cryptographically secure random key 256 bits in length and a cryptographically secure nonce 64 bits in length for Chacha20, or alternatively a 256 bit key and a 128 bit nonce or IV, depending on the desired mode, for Serpent. Note I provide many options here and in the hashes and elliptic curves, but some standardization will be required for the protocol to be useful. Here, Alice selected Chacha20 which, being a stream cipher, operates only in one mode.
Now the program hashes the message, including all unused message space as 0 bits, and digitally signs the hash using Alice's private key in accordance with ECDSA. The hash in this case should be 512 bits which will give approximately 2256 bits of security to the signature. The signature itself will be approximately 1024 bits, which will map to 216 trytes.
The program encrypts the entire message space, including unused space to conceal the message length, with Chacha20 using the ephemeral key and nonce mentioned above. It encrypts Alice's digital signature as well with the same ephemeral key and nonce. Finally, it encrypts the ephemeral key (but not the nonce) using the required number of bits from Px itself as the secret key and all 0s as the nonce. It needs not include the all-zeros nonce in the message because it is fixed by protocol. Then it converts all into trytes. Using the most efficient conversion algorithms, the key will map to a 54 tryte space and the nonce will map to 14 trytes. Together with the 216 trytes for the digital signature, the overhead for this security sums to 284 trytes. The remaining 1903 trytes, or slightly more than 1Kb, may be used for the message body.
To assemble the pieces, Alice's program places them in this order:
  • Ephemeral key for Chacha encrypted by Bob's public key -- 54 trytes
  • Unencrypted nonce for Chacha -- 14 trytes
  • Chacha-encrypted message body, encrypted using ephemeral key and nonce, fixed width including white space, approximately 1900 trytes
  • Alice's signature -- 216 trytes
Alice copies this now-tryte-encoded message text. It will be the payload of her next transaction.
Now Alice opens an offline tool like this excellent program by ixuz07: https://www.reddit.com/Iota/comments/8fe315/how_to_keep_your_iota_secure_offline_cold_storage/
In it, she uses the seed Px to generate addresses. She may select the last one she transmitted to, or she may select the one after that. This will be the receiving address for her message. Now she randomly generates any seed in the world and from it, her sending address. She sends the message to the Px-linked address from her throwaway address, and she is done.
Bob was listening on Px. Specifically, he was listening on the last wallet from Px that he received a message on from Alice, and on the one after that. He need not worry that she will send to a previous wallet or skip further ahead. When Alice's message arrives, Bob sees it quickly.
Now Bob uses a similar program as Alice did. When he puts the entire message body into the program, it breaks out the 4 chunks listed above and changes them from trytes to bytes. It uses the private key derived from Px and an all-zeros nonce to decrypt the ephemeral key. Then it uses the ephemeral key and the included nonce to decrypt the message body and Alice's signature. Finally it confirms that Alice's signature is valid for the message text and presents Bob with this confirmation.
When Bob replies, he will do the same as Alice just did, except he will of course use his private key instead of hers (he does not have hers), and he will use Py everywhere Alice used Px.
Because Alice and Bob are not transmitting from addresses that can be linked to them or to one another from one broadcast to the next, Eve cannot easily correlate these broadcasts. Using public information, she cannot calculate the Px and Py seed and encryption values, so even if she knows Alice and Bob are communicating, she will not determine the wallets or messages involved without breaking EC or otherwise uncovering secret key information.
If Eve does examine a message sent by Alice to Bob, she cannot modify it without detection first because of the indelible nature of the IOTA ledger and secondly because she cannot replicate Alice's signature on the new message. With any modification to the original message, the authentication will fail with overwhelming probability, and Bob will not read the forgery.
Additionally, even looking at a message from Alice to Bob, Eve cannot determine whether it is from Alice to Bob without one of the secret keys to calculate the shared encryption / decryption key.
If Eve finds an address Alice is sending to Bob on, she may employ a botnet to spam false messages to that address. Bob will reject all of them for failing authentication, and with even a very small PoW to post onto the IOTA network, Bob can authenticate or reject messages more quickly than many spammers can post them. Additionally, Alice needs only move to the next wallet under seed Px, and Eve has no easy way to find them and follow. If she does manage to follow, Alice and Bob can safely conclude she has one or both of their private keys. Both will need to create a new private key, calculate a new public key, and distribute to their peers.
Alice and Bob can even share money using this protocol. Because all calculated addresses are used receive only when it comes to regular messaging, Alice and Bob can send money to a shared wallet confident the other will not send out of it at the same time, thus compromising security. Once sent into, the other party sends out, and that wallet is no longer used for communications or any other purpose.
Weaknesses in this protocol are these:
  • This is not quantum resistant even though the IOTA network is. However, with key sizes discussed here, I speculate that the NSA and possibly other government organizations can already penetrate them or soon will. Large corporations should be years away. Individual adversaries like Eve probably will not be capable of breaking this for decades.
  • There is weak protection built in against a replay attack. If Eve can find any message from Alice to Bob, she can copy the entire signed and authenticated message, place it in a new bundle, and transmit to Bob on Px again. If Alice's message was, "Bob please send Eve 500 Miota," Eve could continue to collect payments from Bob that Alice never intended. One safeguard against this is if Alice and Bob agree to always use time stamps in their messages. The replay would then fail a time check if Eve sent it unmodified, and it would fail authentication if she modified it.
  • If either Alice or Bob has her or his private key compromised, every message that individual sent or received, to or from any other party, can be located and read. This weakness is possibly the worst and the one that I would most like to overcome, but it may not be possible. It is the same weakness inherent in an email account, social media account, etc.
  • Only an apparent weakness, not a real one, is that the protocol seems so complex. Almost all of the above can be handled sight unseen to the user, and in a more-developed application, the message generation, encryption, signing, and sending from a random address can all happen with the press of a single button.
  • External libraries. I wanted to make the application completely public domain. Currently, though, I believe I will be stuck using at least the gmp crate and the randomorg chart. The former is because, although I think I could write a Karatsuba algorithm for large integer multiplication, I am not at all certain it would be efficient enough for practical use. The latter crate is to provide true cryptographic quality random numbers essential in programs like this one. As a benefit while I am using the gmp crate anyway, conversion using it from trytes to bytes and vice-versa is as near 100% efficiency as possible. However, they may have GPL or MIT licensing that is not acceptable to everyone. I will have to check that before I publish any code.
TL;DR -- yeah I am putting one at the bottom, too. I've thought a lot about a very simple yet provably end-to-end, provably cryptographically secure, encrypted and authenticated communications system on the IOTA network. The above are my thoughts on it so far. My programming work will take some time, but it follows the pattern I outlined above.
submitted by Anaxamandrous to Iota [link] [comments]

Vault 7 release info from actual files

sorry for the mess. copy paste....
Press Release Today, Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of leaks on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Code-named "Vault 7" by WikiLeaks, it is the largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency. The first full part of the series, "Year Zero", comprises 8,761 documents and files from an isolated, high-security network situated inside the CIA's Center for Cyber Intelligence in Langley, Virgina. It follows an introductory disclosure last month of CIA targeting French political parties and candidates in the lead up to the 2012 presidential election. Recently, the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized "zero day" exploits, malware remote control systems and associated documentation. This extraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor the entire hacking capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have been circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive. "Year Zero" introduces the scope and direction of the CIA's global covert hacking program, its malware arsenal and dozens of "zero day" weaponized exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European company products, include Apple's iPhone, Google's Android and Microsoft's Windows and even Samsung TVs, which are turned into covert microphones. Since 2001 the CIA has gained political and budgetary preeminence over the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA found itself building not just its now infamous drone fleet, but a very different type of covert, globe-spanning force — its own substantial fleet of hackers. The agency's hacking division freed it from having to disclose its often controversial operations to the NSA (its primary bureaucratic rival) in order to draw on the NSA's hacking capacities. By the end of 2016, the CIA's hacking division, which formally falls under the agency's Center for Cyber Intelligence (CCI), had over 5000 registered users and had produced more than a thousand hacking systems, trojans, viruses, and other "weaponized" malware. Such is the scale of the CIA's undertaking that by 2016, its hackers had utilized more code than that used to run Facebook. The CIA had created, in effect, its "own NSA" with even less accountability and without publicly answering the question as to whether such a massive budgetary spend on duplicating the capacities of a rival agency could be justified. In a statement to WikiLeaks the source details policy questions that they say urgently need to be debated in public, including whether the CIA's hacking capabilities exceed its mandated powers and the problem of public oversight of the agency. The source wishes to initiate a public debate about the security, creation, use, proliferation and democratic control of cyberweapons. Once a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by rival states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike. Julian Assange, WikiLeaks editor stated that "There is an extreme proliferation risk in the development of cyber 'weapons'. Comparisons can be drawn between the uncontrolled proliferation of such 'weapons', which results from the inability to contain them combined with their high market value, and the global arms trade. But the significance of "Year Zero" goes well beyond the choice between cyberwar and cyberpeace. The disclosure is also exceptional from a political, legal and forensic perspective." Wikileaks has carefully reviewed the "Year Zero" disclosure and published substantive CIA documentation while avoiding the distribution of 'armed' cyberweapons until a consensus emerges on the technical and political nature of the CIA's program and how such 'weapons' should analyzed, disarmed and published. Wikileaks has also decided to redact and anonymise some identifying information in "Year Zero" for in depth analysis. These redactions include ten of thousands of CIA targets and attack machines throughout Latin America, Europe and the United States. While we are aware of the imperfect results of any approach chosen, we remain committed to our publishing model and note that the quantity of published pages in "Vault 7" part one (“Year Zero”) already eclipses the total number of pages published over the first three years of the Edward Snowden NSA leaks. Analysis CIA malware targets iPhone, Android, smart TVs CIA malware and hacking tools are built by EDG (Engineering Development Group), a software development group within CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence), a department belonging to the CIA's DDI (Directorate for Digital Innovation). The DDI is one of the five major directorates of the CIA (see this organizational chart of the CIA for more details). The EDG is responsible for the development, testing and operational support of all backdoors, exploits, malicious payloads, trojans, viruses and any other kind of malware used by the CIA in its covert operations world-wide. The increasing sophistication of surveillance techniques has drawn comparisons with George Orwell's 1984, but "Weeping Angel", developed by the CIA's Embedded Devices Branch (EDB), which infests smart TVs, transforming them into covert microphones, is surely its most emblematic realization. The attack against Samsung smart TVs was developed in cooperation with the United Kingdom's MI5/BTSS. After infestation, Weeping Angel places the target TV in a 'Fake-Off' mode, so that the owner falsely believes the TV is off when it is on. In 'Fake-Off' mode the TV operates as a bug, recording conversations in the room and sending them over the Internet to a covert CIA server. As of October 2014 the CIA was also looking at infecting the vehicle control systems used by modern cars and trucks. The purpose of such control is not specified, but it would permit the CIA to engage in nearly undetectable assassinations. The CIA's Mobile Devices Branch (MDB) developed numerous attacks to remotely hack and control popular smart phones. Infected phones can be instructed to send the CIA the user's geolocation, audio and text communications as well as covertly activate the phone's camera and microphone. Despite iPhone's minority share (14.5%) of the global smart phone market in 2016, a specialized unit in the CIA's Mobile Development Branch produces malware to infest, control and exfiltrate data from iPhones and other Apple products running iOS, such as iPads. CIA's arsenal includes numerous local and remote "zero days" developed by CIA or obtained from GCHQ, NSA, FBI or purchased from cyber arms contractors such as Baitshop. The disproportionate focus on iOS may be explained by the popularity of the iPhone among social, political, diplomatic and business elites. A similar unit targets Google's Android which is used to run the majority of the world's smart phones (~85%) including Samsung, HTC and Sony. 1.15 billion Android powered phones were sold last year. "Year Zero" shows that as of 2016 the CIA had 24 "weaponized" Android "zero days" which it has developed itself and obtained from GCHQ, NSA and cyber arms contractors. These techniques permit the CIA to bypass the encryption of WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, Wiebo, Confide and Cloackman by hacking the "smart" phones that they run on and collecting audio and message traffic before encryption is applied. CIA malware targets Windows, OSx, Linux, routers The CIA also runs a very substantial effort to infect and control Microsoft Windows users with its malware. This includes multiple local and remote weaponized "zero days", air gap jumping viruses such as "Hammer Drill" which infects software distributed on CD/DVDs, infectors for removable media such as USBs, systems to hide data in images or in covert disk areas ( "Brutal Kangaroo") and to keep its malware infestations going. Many of these infection efforts are pulled together by the CIA's Automated Implant Branch (AIB), which has developed several attack systems for automated infestation and control of CIA malware, such as "Assassin" and "Medusa". Attacks against Internet infrastructure and webservers are developed by the CIA's Network Devices Branch (NDB). The CIA has developed automated multi-platform malware attack and control systems covering Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris, Linux and more, such as EDB's "HIVE" and the related "Cutthroat" and "Swindle" tools, which are described in the examples section below. CIA 'hoarded' vulnerabilities ("zero days") In the wake of Edward Snowden's leaks about the NSA, the U.S. technology industry secured a commitment from the Obama administration that the executive would disclose on an ongoing basis — rather than hoard — serious vulnerabilities, exploits, bugs or "zero days" to Apple, Google, Microsoft, and other US-based manufacturers. Serious vulnerabilities not disclosed to the manufacturers places huge swathes of the population and critical infrastructure at risk to foreign intelligence or cyber criminals who independently discover or hear rumors of the vulnerability. If the CIA can discover such vulnerabilities so can others. The U.S. government's commitment to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process came after significant lobbying by US technology companies, who risk losing their share of the global market over real and perceived hidden vulnerabilities. The government stated that it would disclose all pervasive vulnerabilities discovered after 2010 on an ongoing basis. "Year Zero" documents show that the CIA breached the Obama administration's commitments. Many of the vulnerabilities used in the CIA's cyber arsenal are pervasive and some may already have been found by rival intelligence agencies or cyber criminals. As an example, specific CIA malware revealed in "Year Zero" is able to penetrate, infest and control both the Android phone and iPhone software that runs or has run presidential Twitter accounts. The CIA attacks this software by using undisclosed security vulnerabilities ("zero days") possessed by the CIA but if the CIA can hack these phones then so can everyone else who has obtained or discovered the vulnerability. As long as the CIA keeps these vulnerabilities concealed from Apple and Google (who make the phones) they will not be fixed, and the phones will remain hackable. The same vulnerabilities exist for the population at large, including the U.S. Cabinet, Congress, top CEOs, system administrators, security officers and engineers. By hiding these security flaws from manufacturers like Apple and Google the CIA ensures that it can hack everyone &mdsh; at the expense of leaving everyone hackable. 'Cyberwar' programs are a serious proliferation risk Cyber 'weapons' are not possible to keep under effective control. While nuclear proliferation has been restrained by the enormous costs and visible infrastructure involved in assembling enough fissile material to produce a critical nuclear mass, cyber 'weapons', once developed, are very hard to retain. Cyber 'weapons' are in fact just computer programs which can be pirated like any other. Since they are entirely comprised of information they can be copied quickly with no marginal cost. Securing such 'weapons' is particularly difficult since the same people who develop and use them have the skills to exfiltrate copies without leaving traces — sometimes by using the very same 'weapons' against the organizations that contain them. There are substantial price incentives for government hackers and consultants to obtain copies since there is a global "vulnerability market" that will pay hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for copies of such 'weapons'. Similarly, contractors and companies who obtain such 'weapons' sometimes use them for their own purposes, obtaining advantage over their competitors in selling 'hacking' services. Over the last three years the United States intelligence sector, which consists of government agencies such as the CIA and NSA and their contractors, such as Booze Allan Hamilton, has been subject to unprecedented series of data exfiltrations by its own workers. A number of intelligence community members not yet publicly named have been arrested or subject to federal criminal investigations in separate incidents. Most visibly, on February 8, 2017 a U.S. federal grand jury indicted Harold T. Martin III with 20 counts of mishandling classified information. The Department of Justice alleged that it seized some 50,000 gigabytes of information from Harold T. Martin III that he had obtained from classified programs at NSA and CIA, including the source code for numerous hacking tools. Once a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by peer states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike. U.S. Consulate in Frankfurt is a covert CIA hacker base In addition to its operations in Langley, Virginia the CIA also uses the U.S. consulate in Frankfurt as a covert base for its hackers covering Europe, the Middle East and Africa. CIA hackers operating out of the Frankfurt consulate ( "Center for Cyber Intelligence Europe" or CCIE) are given diplomatic ("black") passports and State Department cover. The instructions for incoming CIA hackers make Germany's counter-intelligence efforts appear inconsequential: "Breeze through German Customs because you have your cover-for-action story down pat, and all they did was stamp your passport"
Your Cover Story (for this trip) Q: Why are you here? A: Supporting technical consultations at the Consulate. Two earlier WikiLeaks publications give further detail on CIA approaches to customs and secondary screening procedures. Once in Frankfurt CIA hackers can travel without further border checks to the 25 European countries that are part of the Shengen open border area — including France, Italy and Switzerland. A number of the CIA's electronic attack methods are designed for physical proximity. These attack methods are able to penetrate high security networks that are disconnected from the internet, such as police record database. In these cases, a CIA officer, agent or allied intelligence officer acting under instructions, physically infiltrates the targeted workplace. The attacker is provided with a USB containing malware developed for the CIA for this purpose, which is inserted into the targeted computer. The attacker then infects and exfiltrates data to removable media. For example, the CIA attack system Fine Dining, provides 24 decoy applications for CIA spies to use. To witnesses, the spy appears to be running a program showing videos (e.g VLC), presenting slides (Prezi), playing a computer game (Breakout2, 2048) or even running a fake virus scanner (Kaspersky, McAfee, Sophos). But while the decoy application is on the screen, the underlaying system is automatically infected and ransacked. How the CIA dramatically increased proliferation risks In what is surely one of the most astounding intelligence own goals in living memory, the CIA structured its classification regime such that for the most market valuable part of "Vault 7" — the CIA's weaponized malware (implants + zero days), Listening Posts (LP), and Command and Control (C2) systems — the agency has little legal recourse. The CIA made these systems unclassified. Why the CIA chose to make its cyberarsenal unclassified reveals how concepts developed for military use do not easily crossover to the 'battlefield' of cyber 'war'. To attack its targets, the CIA usually requires that its implants communicate with their control programs over the internet. If CIA implants, Command & Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers could be prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the Internet. Consequently the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber spying/war code unclassified. The U.S. government is not able to assert copyright either, due to restrictions in the U.S. Constitution. This means that cyber 'arms' manufactures and computer hackers can freely "pirate" these 'weapons' if they are obtained. The CIA has primarily had to rely on obfuscation to protect its malware secrets. Conventional weapons such as missiles may be fired at the enemy (i.e into an unsecured area). Proximity to or impact with the target detonates the ordnance including its classified parts. Hence military personnel do not violate classification rules by firing ordnance with classified parts. Ordnance will likely explode. If it does not, that is not the operator's intent. Over the last decade U.S. hacking operations have been increasingly dressed up in military jargon to tap into Department of Defense funding streams. For instance, attempted "malware injections" (commercial jargon) or "implant drops" (NSA jargon) are being called "fires" as if a weapon was being fired. However the analogy is questionable. Unlike bullets, bombs or missiles, most CIA malware is designed to live for days or even years after it has reached its 'target'. CIA malware does not "explode on impact" but rather permanently infests its target. In order to infect target's device, copies of the malware must be placed on the target's devices, giving physical possession of the malware to the target. To exfiltrate data back to the CIA or to await further instructions the malware must communicate with CIA Command & Control (C2) systems placed on internet connected servers. But such servers are typically not approved to hold classified information, so CIA command and control systems are also made unclassified. A successful 'attack' on a target's computer system is more like a series of complex stock maneuvers in a hostile take-over bid or the careful planting of rumors in order to gain control over an organization's leadership rather than the firing of a weapons system. If there is a military analogy to be made, the infestation of a target is perhaps akin to the execution of a whole series of military maneuvers against the target's territory including observation, infiltration, occupation and exploitation. Evading forensics and anti-virus A series of standards lay out CIA malware infestation patterns which are likely to assist forensic crime scene investigators as well as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Samsung, Nokia, Blackberry, Siemens and anti-virus companies attribute and defend against attacks. "Tradecraft DO's and DON'Ts" contains CIA rules on how its malware should be written to avoid fingerprints implicating the "CIA, US government, or its witting partner companies" in "forensic review". Similar secret standards cover the use of encryption to hide CIA hacker and malware communication (pdf), describing targets & exfiltrated data (pdf) as well as executing payloads (pdf) and persisting (pdf) in the target's machines over time.
CIA hackers developed successful attacks against most well known anti-virus programs. These are documented in AV defeats, Personal Security Products, Detecting and defeating PSPs and PSP/DebuggeRE Avoidance. For example, Comodo was defeated by CIA malware placing itself in the Window's "Recycle Bin". While Comodo 6.x has a "Gaping Hole of DOOM". CIA hackers discussed what the NSA's "Equation Group" hackers did wrong and how the CIA's malware makers could avoid similar exposure. Examples The CIA's Engineering Development Group (EDG) management system contains around 500 different projects (only some of which are documented by "Year Zero") each with their own sub-projects, malware and hacker tools. The majority of these projects relate to tools that are used for penetration, infestation ("implanting"), control, and exfiltration. Another branch of development focuses on the development and operation of Listening Posts (LP) and Command and Control (C2) systems used to communicate with and control CIA implants; special projects are used to target specific hardware from routers to smart TVs. Some example projects are described below, but see the table of contents for the full list of projects described by WikiLeaks' "Year Zero". UMBRAGE The CIA's hand crafted hacking techniques pose a problem for the agency. Each technique it has created forms a "fingerprint" that can be used by forensic investigators to attribute multiple different attacks to the same entity. This is analogous to finding the same distinctive knife wound on multiple separate murder victims. The unique wounding style creates suspicion that a single murderer is responsible. As soon one murder in the set is solved then the other murders also find likely attribution. The CIA's Remote Devices Branch's UMBRAGE group collects and maintains a substantial library of attack techniques 'stolen' from malware produced in other states including the Russian Federation. With UMBRAGE and related projects the CIA cannot only increase its total number of attack types but also misdirect attribution by leaving behind the "fingerprints" of the groups that the attack techniques were stolen from. UMBRAGE components cover keyloggers, password collection, webcam capture, data destruction, persistence, privilege escalation, stealth, anti-virus (PSP) avoidance and survey techniques. Fine Dining Fine Dining comes with a standardized questionnaire i.e menu that CIA case officers fill out. The questionnaire is used by the agency's OSB (Operational Support Branch) to transform the requests of case officers into technical requirements for hacking attacks (typically "exfiltrating" information from computer systems) for specific operations. The questionnaire allows the OSB to identify how to adapt existing tools for the operation, and communicate this to CIA malware configuration staff. The OSB functions as the interface between CIA operational staff and the relevant technical support staff. Among the list of possible targets of the collection are 'Asset', 'Liason Asset', 'System Administrator', 'Foreign Information Operations', 'Foreign Intelligence Agencies' and 'Foreign Government Entities'. Notably absent is any reference to extremists or transnational criminals. The 'Case Officer' is also asked to specify the environment of the target like the type of computer, operating system used, Internet connectivity and installed anti-virus utilities (PSPs) as well as a list of file types to be exfiltrated like Office documents, audio, video, images or custom file types. The 'menu' also asks for information if recurring access to the target is possible and how long unobserved access to the computer can be maintained. This information is used by the CIA's 'JQJIMPROVISE' software (see below) to configure a set of CIA malware suited to the specific needs of an operation. Improvise (JQJIMPROVISE) 'Improvise' is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and Linux (DanceFloor). Its configuration utilities like Margarita allows the NOC (Network Operation Center) to customize tools based on requirements from 'Fine Dining' questionairies. HIVE HIVE is a multi-platform CIA malware suite and its associated control software. The project provides customizable implants for Windows, Solaris, MikroTik (used in internet routers) and Linux platforms and a Listening Post (LP)/Command and Control (C2) infrastructure to communicate with these implants. The implants are configured to communicate via HTTPS with the webserver of a cover domain; each operation utilizing these implants has a separate cover domain and the infrastructure can handle any number of cover domains. Each cover domain resolves to an IP address that is located at a commercial VPS (Virtual Private Server) provider. The public-facing server forwards all incoming traffic via a VPN to a 'Blot' server that handles actual connection requests from clients. It is setup for optional SSL client authentication: if a client sends a valid client certificate (only implants can do that), the connection is forwarded to the 'Honeycomb' toolserver that communicates with the implant; if a valid certificate is missing (which is the case if someone tries to open the cover domain website by accident), the traffic is forwarded to a cover server that delivers an unsuspicious looking website. The Honeycomb toolserver receives exfiltrated information from the implant; an operator can also task the implant to execute jobs on the target computer, so the toolserver acts as a C2 (command and control) server for the implant. Similar functionality (though limited to Windows) is provided by the RickBobby project. See the classified user and developer guides for HIVE.
Frequently Asked Questions Why now? WikiLeaks published as soon as its verification and analysis were ready. In Febuary the Trump administration has issued an Executive Order calling for a "Cyberwar" review to be prepared within 30 days. While the review increases the timeliness and relevance of the publication it did not play a role in setting the publication date. Redactions Names, email addresses and external IP addresses have been redacted in the released pages (70,875 redactions in total) until further analysis is complete. Over-redaction: Some items may have been redacted that are not employees, contractors, targets or otherwise related to the agency, but are, for example, authors of documentation for otherwise public projects that are used by the agency. Identity vs. person: the redacted names are replaced by user IDs (numbers) to allow readers to assign multiple pages to a single author. Given the redaction process used a single person may be represented by more than one assigned identifier but no identifier refers to more than one real person. Archive attachments (zip, tar.gz, ...) are replaced with a PDF listing all the file names in the archive. As the archive content is assessed it may be made available; until then the archive is redacted. Attachments with other binary content are replaced by a hex dump of the content to prevent accidental invocation of binaries that may have been infected with weaponized CIA malware. As the content is assessed it may be made available; until then the content is redacted. The tens of thousands of routable IP addresses references (including more than 22 thousand within the United States) that correspond to possible targets, CIA covert listening post servers, intermediary and test systems, are redacted for further exclusive investigation. Binary files of non-public origin are only available as dumps to prevent accidental invocation of CIA malware infected binaries. Organizational Chart The organizational chart corresponds to the material published by WikiLeaks so far. Since the organizational structure of the CIA below the level of Directorates is not public, the placement of the EDG and its branches within the org chart of the agency is reconstructed from information contained in the documents released so far. It is intended to be used as a rough outline of the internal organization; please be aware that the reconstructed org chart is incomplete and that internal reorganizations occur frequently. Wiki pages "Year Zero" contains 7818 web pages with 943 attachments from the internal development groupware. The software used for this purpose is called Confluence, a proprietary software from Atlassian. Webpages in this system (like in Wikipedia) have a version history that can provide interesting insights on how a document evolved over time; the 7818 documents include these page histories for 1136 latest versions. The order of named pages within each level is determined by date (oldest first). Page content is not present if it was originally dynamically created by the Confluence software (as indicated on the re-constructed page). What time period is covered? The years 2013 to 2016. The sort order of the pages within each level is determined by date (oldest first). WikiLeaks has obtained the CIA's creation/last modification date for each page but these do not yet appear for technical reasons. Usually the date can be discerned or approximated from the content and the page order. If it is critical to know the exact time/date contact WikiLeaks. What is "Vault 7" "Vault 7" is a substantial collection of material about CIA activities obtained by WikiLeaks. When was each part of "Vault 7" obtained? Part one was obtained recently and covers through 2016. Details on the other parts will be available at the time of publication. Is each part of "Vault 7" from a different source? Details on the other parts will be available at the time of publication. What is the total size of "Vault 7"? The series is the largest intelligence publication in history. How did WikiLeaks obtain each part of "Vault 7"? Sources trust WikiLeaks to not reveal information that might help identify them. Isn't WikiLeaks worried that the CIA will act against its staff to stop the series? No. That would be certainly counter-productive. Has WikiLeaks already 'mined' all the best stories? No. WikiLeaks has intentionally not written up hundreds of impactful stories to encourage others to find them and so create expertise in the area for subsequent parts in the series. They're there. Look. Those who demonstrate journalistic excellence may be considered for early access to future parts. Won't other journalists find all the best stories before me? Unlikely. There are very considerably more stories than there are journalists or academics who are in a position to write them.
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